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MASSACHUSETTS
Trio Algarvio, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 795 N.E.2d
1148 (Mass. 2003) (upholding assessment of tidewater displacement
fee, and denying assessment of tidelands occupation fee as conditions
of granting license to fill tidelands).
In 1995, Trio Algarvio, Inc. ("Trio"), the present owner of land
adjoining the Acushnet River in New Bedford, applied to the
Protection
Environmental
of
Department
Massachusetts
("Department") for a license to use one-half acre of tidelands
previously filled by Trio's predecessor without authorization. The
Department granted the license, but also assessed Trio a tidewater
displacement fee and a tidelands occupation fee. Trio challenged the
assessments, and an administrative law judge affirmed the assessments
at an adjudicatory hearing. Trio filed for judicial review in superior
court, arguing that the relevant wharfing statute exempted it from
both fees. The superior court rejected this argument and affirmed the
assessments. The appellate court found Trio's argument persuasive
and reversed the superior court's judgment. The Department then
appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
On appeal, the court first discussed the history of the relevant
wharfing statutes. The statutes granted private ownership in certain
tidelands below low water mark to encourage the development of
facilities to enhance navigable waters for commercial purposes.
in the later nineteenth century however, the
Beginning
Commonwealth's legislature enacted legislation to protect the
waterways-unregulated development was beginning to displace the
tidewater and thus ruin the resource. The laws required either
excavation elsewhere in the same harbor or payment of a fee as
compensation for the displacement of tidewater from the development
of wharves and piers. In addition, the legislature established tidelands
occupation fees as a means of compensating for the right to develop
tidelands belonging to the Commonwealth.
Trio specifically argued that requiring landowners to pay a
displacement fee for work authorized by a wharfing statute was in
derogation of the grant made by the statute. Trio relied on three cases
that held individuals developing tidelands under similar wharfing
statutes need not pay displacement fees. In all three cases, the courts
determined that to assess the landowners displacement fees would be
in derogation of the original land grants since the landowners had
already compensated for the tidewater displacement under the specific
terms of the wharfing statutes. However, the court found that the
wharfing statute at issue in this case contained no means or conditions
to compensate for tidewater displacement. In contrast, the wharfing
statute applicable in this case reserved the right in the Commonwealth
to impose later conditions or requirements as necessary to protect the

Issue 2

COURT REPOR7S

waterways. The court further explained that even if the statute did not
expressly grant this right to the Commonwealth, the public trust
doctrine would permit the Department to assess Trio the displacement
fee.
Nonetheless, the court determined that the Department's
assessment of tidelands occupation fees may have been in derogation
of the wharfing statute grant to Trio. The court analyzed the history of
the Commonwealth's practice of granting title to tidelands. Prior to
1866, Massachusetts granted title to tidelands in fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent, as was done under the wharfing statutes.
However, in 1866, the Commonwealth established a licensing scheme
whereby the legislature issued revocable licenses for the use of
tidelands and charged fees-tidelands occupation fees-for the
privilege of occupying the lands. The legislature took care to state that
its new licensing scheme would have no affect whatsoever on previous
grants. Thus, the court determined that if a landowner seeking a
license to fill or occupy tidelands held title to the land, the occupation
fees did not apply; but if a landowner did not hold title to the land, the
fees did apply. Thus, the status of Trio's land was determinative of
whether or not it was subject to the tidelands occupation fee. Since
the superior court never defined Trio's title, the court remanded the
issue for further proceedings.
Kate 0. Lively

MICHIGAN
City of Romulus v. Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 260 Mich. App. 54
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding it was not improper for the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality to issue a permit for a
hazardous waste underground deep injection well facility in a legally
filled wetland, and that need for such a facility is not a factor
considered when issuing such permits).
Environmental Disposal Systems Inc. ("EDS") undertook a project
to obtain a permit to construct a hazardous waste underground deep
injection well facility on an undeveloped site in the City of Romulus.
EDS obtained many of the necessary permits and was in the process of
applying to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
("MDEQ") for a Part 111 permit, required under the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA"), when they
learned of wetlands located on the proposed site. According to
applicable regulations, a facility of this nature could not be located in
a wetland. Upon learning of the wetland, EDS obtained an NREPA
Part 303 permit from MDEQ authorizing them to fill the wetland and
destroy it. EDS then proceeded to fill the wetland and continued with
the application process for the Part 111 permit to construct the facility.

